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Abstract 
This article argues that situated approaches are necessary to reveal institu-
tion-specific or regime specific structures, forms and uses of fiscal welfare 
instruments. We base our analysis on the French case, for which we have 
previously built an exhaustive database of social tax expenditures (STEs) 
for the year 2014. We find that France displays a specific structure of fiscal 
welfare. Most STEs are concentrated in the fields of employment, family 
and health policy; most STEs concern social security contributions. We 
identify specific forms of fiscal welfare which might be common to other 
Bismarckian countries, principally centred around three types of use, i) the 
reduced taxation of family and couples, which is a core element of the fami-
lialist organisation of social policy after WWII ; ii) the use of STEs as a 
privileged instrument of employment policy in the constrained realm of 
minima wages and high levels of social security contributions ; iii) the use 
of STEs to quietly divert resources away from the sheltered social security 
funds and into collective private insurance plans, fuelling their develop-
ment.  
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In its endeavour to identify the particularities of various types of wel-
fare institutions, the European comparative political economy litera-
ture of the last 20 years pays much attention to the outputs of welfare 
states (i.e. amounts of social expenditures, changes in policy design, 
or types of risks addressed by social policies). This article argues that 
paying an equal attention to the input side of the welfare state, and in 
particular to its revenues, allows for a more complete and adequate 
picture. Indeed, the revenue side of the welfare state is likely to be “a 
critical independent shaper of social welfare outcomes” (Hacker, 
2002:294): in that regard, not only are modes of financing and the 
progressivity of the tax system important (Kato, 2003; Ganghof, 
2006), but specific tax policies and instruments are also likely to cons-
titute typical features of particular welfare states.  
The intuition that tax instruments were relevant to the understanding 
of social policy is at the core of the “fiscal welfare” concept (Titmuss, 
1958). Beyond the provision of social services and direct spending 
programs, it reintroduced into the definition of the welfare state the 
myriad of specific tax dispositions which fulfil a social purpose. So-
cial tax expenditures (hereafter STEs) are an operationalization of this 
concept; they are tax instruments aimed not at raising revenue but at 
“modifying, correcting, complementing, or undoing social policy” 
(Morel et al 2016:6); they are equivalent to direct spending programs 
to the extent that they result in foregone revenue for the state which 
have the same effect as expenditures on public finances.  
Although it has been mainly studied in the context of liberal welfare 
states, and in particular in that of the US, fiscal welfare instruments 
are found in many different institutional and political contexts (see 
e.g. Adema et al. 2014, Morel et al. 2016). This article argues that 
situated approaches are needed to reveal different structures and diffe-
rent uses of fiscal welfare. The underlying intuition is the following: 
because STEs are used to complement, modify or undo existing social 
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policies, we can expect to find institution-specific or regime-specific 
structures, forms and uses of fiscal welfare in different contexts.  
We base our analysis on the French case, for which we have previou-
sly built an exhaustive database of social tax expenditures for the year 
2014 (Houssoy and Zemmour, 2016). Using both aggregate and 
scheme-specific analyses of French fiscal welfare, we show that the 
main components of French fiscal welfare can be described as a Bis-
marckian form of fiscal welfare. This finding goes beyond introducing 
a new nuance in the instruments already described in the literature: 
important aspects, regarding both the function and effects of some 
STEs, and the way they affect the welfare state as a whole, cannot be 
understood without acknowledging institutional configurations. Un-
like the US, France combines a high level of social expenditures and a 
relatively high level of STEs (Adema et al. 2014, Houssoy and Zem-
mour, 2016) and can be described as a statist version of a Bismarckian 
welfare state. Among its other distinctive institutional traits, the 
French welfare state is strongly familialist, and is mostly funded 
through social contributions, earmarked for social security funds that 
are administered separately from the government budget. France also 
has a high minimum wage with universal coverage. This background 
determines a specific structure of fiscal welfare: most STEs concen-
trate on the field of employment, family and health policy, and many 
concern social security contributions. The specific use and form of 
certain STEs reveal a particular form of fiscal welfare, which might be 
common to other Bismarckian countries: i) the specific taxation of 
family and couples, which is a core element of the familialist organi-
sation of social policy after WWII; ii) the use of STEs as a privileged 
instrument of employment policy in the constrained realm of high 
level of minima wages and of social security contributions; iii) the use 
of STEs to quietly divert resources away from the sheltered social 
security funds and into collective private insurance funds, fuelling 
their development. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: 
we start by presenting a general panorama of France’s social tax ex-
penditures in 2014 (section 2) and analyse the distribution of use by 
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policy field. Then we analyse the role of the main STEs in the French 
context: we analyse the contribution of fiscal welfare to the institutio-
nal familialism (section 3), to employment policy (section 4), and to 
the development of private social insurance (section 5). The final sec-
tion concludes. 
II. Fiscal welfare in France: what does it look like, and how big is 
it?  
As of 2016, there does not exist any official synthetic dataset accoun-
ting for all the social tax expenditures contributing to social protection 
and employment policies in France. Since the late 1990s, the OECD 
has developed a comparative dataset (Adema et al., 1997 and follo-
wing) on net social expenditures, which account for a part of these 
STEs. Yet, this dataset has a limited coverage, with some important 
schemes missing: for instance, STEs taking the form of reduced tax 
rates are not included. Neither are exemptions of social security con-
tributions intended as incentives for job creation, or incentives for 
private pension plans. Generally speaking, the perimeter adopted va-
ries regularly, as a result of more or less arbitrary decisions on the part 
of the national administrations communicating the data. In 2011, 27% 
of the schemes that were included lacked an estimation of their cost. 
Moreover, this data is not published at the national level.  
Thus, for the present article, we rely on a dataset constructed from 
various administrative sources by Houssoy and Zemmour (2016), 
which compiles all the tax expenditures listed (although not in one 
place) by the administration, adding some that are missing2. From this 
dataset, we extracted all schemes fulfilling a social policy or employ-
ment purpose. As this paper aims to inquire into the extent and nature 
                                                 
2 Some tax expenditures are not reported by the administration. This is either because these instruments 
are considered to be part of the fiscal norm (and not as a “departure” from it, cf. Surrey and McDaniel, 
1985:3) as is the case for the Quotient Familial, which cost in 2014 is estimated around 8.5 billion euros. 
Alternatively, some STEs can be out of the scope of the state’s monitoring: for instance because unem-
ployment funds are handled separately by the social partners, the cost of exemptions to these funds is not 
reported by the administration.  
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of fiscal welfare in France, such a function-oriented approach in defi-
ning our perimeter seems warranted. Table 1 proposes a typology of 
STEs in the French system distributed into four types.   
The costs indicated are for 2011. They are estimated in “initial reve-
nue loss” that is to say without considering potential change in 
taxpayers’ behaviour and without considering potential interaction 
between different schemes. For this last reason, the cost estimated for 
the four different types should not be summed.  
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Table 1: Social Tax expenditures by type 
STE’s by type  (Initial revenue loss) 
Type 1: Tax break on earmarked resources for social protection (exemption 
and reduced rate on social security contributions etc.) €42 bn 
Type 2 & 3: « Tax 
Breaks for Social 
Purposes » (TBSP) 
of which Cat. 2: equivalent to cash benefit  €21 bn 
E.g. : « Prime pour l’emploi », Quotient familial 
of which Cat. 3: Conditional on private expenditure 
[incentives]  
€14 bn 
E.g. : Crédit d’impôt pour l’emploi d’une aide à 
domicile, incitations à la souscription d’une complé-
mentaire santé… 
Category 4: Reduced rate or exemption of social benefits €15 bn 
E.g. : Exclusion of family benefit and minimal income schemes from the PIT  
Reproduced from Zemmour (2013) 
Type 1 STEs are included in the table, not because they explicitly ful-
fil a social purpose, but because they correspond to the foregoing of 
revenue originally earmarked for social protection financing (mostly 
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social security contributions). As such, they directly affect the finan-
cing of social insurance funds on which a large part of the French wel-
fare system rests. Incidentally, it is also the case that most of these 
schemes fulfil an employment policy purpose (reducing employers’ 
social contributions to compress labour costs). Others aim to increase 
employees’ purchasing power by developing additional forms of com-
pensation characterized by no (or far less) social contributions, such as 
employee saving plans, luncheon vouchers, etc. In this article, in order 
to stick to our goal-oriented, fiscal welfare perimeter, we thus restrict 
our analyses to the former, i.e. Type 1 STEs with an employment po-
licy purpose. These are thus included on two different grounds: first 
because employment policy fits into a comprehensive understanding 
of “welfare”; second, because these schemes affect a core feature of 
the French Bismarckian Welfare State, that is, its specific funding 
mechanism through earmarked social contributions.  
Type 2 and 3 STEs correspond to the two types of Tax Breaks for So-
cial Purpose (TBSPs) identified by Adema et al (1997 and following). 
Type 2 refers to schemes that are “equivalent to a cash benefit”. These 
STEs are conditional on the situation (realization of a social risk), sta-
tus, or income of the recipient (just as cash benefits). The Prime Pour 
l’Emploi, an in-work benefit created in 2001 (and transformed into a 
cash benefit in 2016, see infra) and the Quotient Familial (see infra), 
an income tax reduction awarded to families depending on the number 
of children, are examples of Type 2 STEs.  
Type 3 STEs are conditional on the purchase of private social protec-
tion. These generally take the form of tax rebates (on personal income 
tax, VAT, employer social security contributions or corporate taxa-
tion) proportional to the amounts spent privately. Mostly, these STEs 
reward the subscription to certain types of private social insurances, or 
the purchase of private care services. 
Type 4 STEs are preferential tax rates on social benefits. For instance, 
exemptions of means-tested benefits from personal income tax, a re-
duced rate of CSG (a payroll tax earmarked for social security finan-
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cing) or of housing tax for low income pensioners, would all fall in 
that category.  
Sums involved are far from negligible: type 1 STEs amount to close to 
2 points of GDP and 45% of total STEs, while categories 2 & 3 put 
together amount to 1.7 points of GDP and 37% of total STEs. The 
sheer number of STEs is also noteworthy: based on Houssoy and 
Zemmour (2016), we recorded no less than 153 STE schemes opera-
ting in 2014. 
Figure 1 - Fiscal welfare in France: estimation of cost by main public policy  
(in million euros, in 2014) 
 
The amounts presented in Figure 1 are conservative estimates: indeed, 
data presented in Houssoy and Zemmour (2016) is an exhaustive and 
corrected inventory of measures listed by the administration; yet in 
many cases, schemes are listed, but their cost is not estimated, poten-
tially because it is likely to be negligible, or because the administra-
tion cannot simulate the amount involved. Of the 153 measures analy-
zed, 18.8 % were marked as “non comptabilisé”, “not counted”, by the 
administration.  
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Figure 1 reveals a first typical feature of French fiscal welfare, which 
has to do with its structure: around 40% of the total spending (in reve-
nue foregone) is made up of STEs for employment policy, while STEs 
for income support, family and health policy (especially subsidizing 
certain form of private insurance) make up more than 45% of the total. 
The predominant presence of STEs in these three policy sectors ap-
pears significantly distinctive from what we know of other European 
countries (see Morel et al 2016), and is certainly at odds with the pic-
ture of fiscal welfare in liberal countries presented in the literature 
where pensions usually constitute the bulk of spending on STEs. 
Beyond this general picture of the structure, a closer look within those 
prevalent policy sectors reveals that a sizeable share of the total cost 
tends to be concentrated on a reduced number of specific policies. 
Predominantly, these policies tend to take the form of exemptions or 
reduction of social security contributions. The widespread use of these 
specific instruments constitutes a second typical feature of fiscal wel-
fare in France.  
III. Fiscal Welfare as a key component of the French familialism 
A first specificity of French fiscal welfare is that its use dates back to 
the early expansion of the French welfare state, and is deeply consis-
tent with a one of its main aspect, namely familialism. The total cost 
of STEs in the field of family policy in revenue foregone is € 19.65 
bn. This amount is concentrated on three specific policies the cost of 
which is superior to € 1bn (Figure 2): First, two specific schemes or-
ganize a reduced taxation of families (quotient familial and quotient 
conjugal [see below]). Second, family benefits are excluded from the 
PIT tax basis. Third, different tax credits on the personal income tax 
(PIT hereafter) reimburse half of childcare expenditures3. In what fol-
lows we focus on the reduced taxation of families which represents 
                                                 
3 A specific tax credit (50% of expenditures, under a ceiling of 2300€ per year and per child) concerns 
childcare for children under six, when it is organized out of the family’s home, and amounts to around €1 
bn. When children are kept at home the tax credit scheme (50% of expenditures, under a ceiling of 15 
000€ per year) and payroll tax exemption are the same as for any other personal services.  
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the lion’s share and which we consider to be key in the French institu-
tional setting. 
Figure2  – Tax expenditures for family policy: breakdown by type and estima-
tion of cost (in million euros, in 2014) 
 
The French welfare state is known for its high level of familialism 
(Esping Andersen 1996). It was built on the male breadwinner model, 
with eligibility to social security benefits traditionally relying on em-
ployment status and covering the worker and his family members 
(spouse and children). The base unit of the core social security 
schemes is thus the family “headed” by a male wage-earner (including 
a second income earner or not). Although some of the schemes have 
evolved in a more universalist direction (especially health insurance), 
familialism and gender differentiation of entitlements (de facto and de 
jure) remain strongly dominant, both in the traditional social insu-
rances and the most recent means-tested assistance schemes (minimal 
income and housing benefits are means-tested at household level) (Pé-
rivier 2010). From the origin of the French welfare state, the French 
declension of fiscal welfare fully contributed to this general orienta-
tion.  
The joint taxation of spouses can be traced back to the implementation 
of the progressive income tax which was first introduced in 1917, as 
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the coverage of social insurance was still very limited. Yet the prefe-
rential taxation of couples (quotient conjugal) and families (quotient 
familial) and the generalization of family benefits have been imple-
mented almost simultaneously (respectively in December 1945 for the 
two former and August 1946 for the latter) with the creation of the 
Sécurité sociale.   
The “Quotient familial” and “Quotient conjugal” are a cornerstone of 
the French progressive “personal” income tax4. Indeed the PIT is com-
puted on a family basis under the following rules: i) the joint taxation 
of the couple applies to couples wedded or with a civil union (PACS) 
ii) the state applies a specific form of equivalence scale to household 
composition, and the marginal tax rate depends on this equivalence 
scale. The whole household income is divided by a certain number of 
“shares”: 1 share for each of the first two adults of the household, 0.5 
share for each of the first two children, and 1 share for the children 
with rank 3 or higher5. In certain specific situation (child over 20 but 
in higher education, disabled child, etc.) an additional share can be 
granted. The average tax rate is a growing function of the household 
income divided by the number of shares. The embedded logic of this 
system is that each household should be taxed based on its contribu-
tive capacity, and the latter should be determined not on the sole in-
come basis but taking into account the household composition. More 
specifically, the idea is that the (male) head of family is taxed, taking 
into account its family load (spouse and children). 
A consequence of the system of shares is that “the gain per child” is a 
growing function of household’s income (Baclet et al.  2007) reinfor-
cing thus primary income inequalities, while the “gain of being 
wedded” is a growing function both of household’s income and on the 
unequal repartition of earning between spouses (Eidelman 2013). 
Consequently the quotient conjugal functions as a disincentive to 
                                                 
4 There is a second non progressive income tax (the Contribution Sociale Généralisée) which is ear-
marked for social security funds. As opposed to the progressive PIT, the CSG is an individual and flat 
rate tax. 
5 The specific weight of children with rank 3 or higher dates back to 1980. 
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work for the second income earner, typically women (Carbonnier 
2014).  
Far from being in contradiction with the French welfare state logic, 
these components of fiscal welfare constitute an essential pillar of the 
French version of Bismarckian familialism, the other pillar being the 
entitlement and calculation rules of family social benefits. Functional-
ly, these STEs reinforce the effect of the Social Welfare components. 
For instance, family benefits as well as quotient familial get dispro-
portionally higher for families with more than 2 children. They also 
converge in cushioning or neutralizing the effect of the number of 
children on standards of living (Sterdyniak 2011). The two quotients 
work consistently with direct benefits to organize the gendered divi-
sion of social activities. Financially, the size of this part of the French 
Fiscal Welfare is far from negligible as compared with social welfare. 
In 2014, together the quotient familial and the quotient conjugal 
amounted to €13.7 billion, while family cash benefits amounted to 
around €36 billion.  
IV. Employment policy under institutional constraints: a trick to 
conciliate Bismarckian social protection and high minimum 
wage  
Besides its familialism, a second specificity of the Bismarckian wel-
fare state consists in its particular funding structure. Social protection 
expenditures are mostly funded through social security contributions, 
which are earmarked to Social Security funds. This, combined with a 
high minimum wage, has led successive governments to intensively 
use tax expenditures as the privileged tool of employment policy.  
France is the country where social security contributions represent the 
largest share of social protection funding. Social security contributions 
are based on labour compensation and, since the 1980s, it has been 
strongly criticized for at least two reasons: first, social security contri-
butions are suspected of enhancing labour costs and in turn of genera-
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ting unemployment6; second, this funding system has been said to be 
appropriate only to fund statutory benefits; universal benefits (such as 
health insurance, family benefits) should instead be funded by taxes 
levied on all types of income. For this reason, the French employer 
association, who had formerly accepted a continuous increase in con-
tribution rates, started campaigning in the beginning of the 1980s to 
cut social contributions, especially the employer part (Palier 2005). 
After the change of monetary regime that prevented France from ad-
justing its trade balance through devaluation, the conventional wisdom 
according to which labour costs should be diminished by cutting so-
cial contributions became a consensual view among top civil servants 
and major left and right wing parties.  
However, for different reasons (its actuarial design and the contributo-
ry logic associated with it, the involvement of unions in the go-
vernance of social security funds, and the separation between the res-
pective budgets of the Sécurité sociale and of the general govern-
ment), it has long been politically unsustainable to cut either the ag-
gregate level of social spending7, or social security contributions, 
which enjoy a very high level of legitimacy (Esping Andersen, 1996).  
This analysis remains relevant: between 2000 and 2013, in a repeated 
survey on 4000 respondents (Baromètre d’opinion Drees, 2000-2013), 
the assertion that “firms should pay less for social protection” receives 
on average 8% of favourable opinions, while 38% of respondents sup-
port a raise in employer social contributions, and 47% defend the sta-
tus quo (Zemmour, 2015). Consequently, the statutory rate of social 
contributions reached a peak in the middle of 1990s and has been kept 
almost frozen since then. 
                                                 
6 Economic studies however show that the link between social security contributions, labour costs and 
employment is however far less direct than often argued. The essential part of the cost of contributions is 
in fact supported by workers (through lower net wages) rather than by employers (through labour costs); 
moreover the elasticity of labour demand to labour cost varies a lot for different levels of skills and 
different sectors. 
7 Effective reduction of individual level benefits have been implemented but this effect has been more 
than compensated by the demographic evolution. 
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A second important institutional feature is the legal minimum wage, 
which is relatively high and covers the full employee population (with 
the exception of apprentices below an age limit). This minimum wage 
enjoys broad popularity, and governments have been compelled to 
raise it, on average following the growth rate. In 1994, attempts to 
restrain the scope of the minimum wage by introducing a different 
minimum for individuals below the age of 26 triggered mass demons-
trations and was abandoned by the government. 
The combination of a high minimum wage and a relatively high rate 
of social contributions, both enjoying a broad political support, and 
benefiting from a consensus among unions, meant that governments 
have had a very restricted room for manoeuvre, and a limited choice 
of instruments, when it came to influencing labour cost. Yet, as ex-
plained above, since the late 1980s this had become a prominent issue 
on the political agenda of successive governments. 
In this institutional context, a different type of STEs became the main 
tool, for governments from the left and the right, to reduce labour 
costs while maintaining unchanged the statutory contribution rate, the 
level of social security resources, and the dynamism of the net mini-
mum wage. Altogether, these various STEs constitute a particular and 
typical part of French fiscal welfare, which we argue has been deve-
loped as a tool for actively managing the labour cost, in a context 
where key institutions of the French Welfare System, which could not 
be dismantled because of the political support they enjoyed, pushed 
that cost upwards. Here then, fiscal welfare was designed to circum-
vent specific Bismarckian institutions, when reforming these upfront 
seemed unfeasible. 
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Figure 3 – Tax expenditures for employment policy: breakdown by type and 
estimation of cost (in million euros, in 2014) 
The total cost of STEs in the field of employment policy in revenue 
foregone is € 37.9 bn. This amount is concentrated on 6 specific poli-
cies which cost is superior to € 1bn. (Figure 3). 
IV.1 General job-creation incentives: the case of the “general 
exemptions” of social security contributions 
The main pillar of French employment policy since the mid 1990s is 
called the “general exemption” of social contributions on low wages 
program. While social contribution rates are theoretically flat rate (at 
least under a certain ceiling), exemptions allow firms to pay a reduced 
rate of employer contribution for employees under a certain gross 
wage level. This has clearly a status of tax expenditure and should not 
be confused with a simple cut in contributions since i) the official 
statutory rate common to all workers remains in force ii) the state is 
legally committed to repaying to the Social security fund the entire 
revenue forgone for each concerned worker iii) contributory entitle-
ments of concerned workers (especially to pensions) are not affected 
by the exemptions.  
Between 1994 and 2008, France implemented no less than 8 bills re-
ducing the effective rate of employers’ social security contributions on 
low wages (L’Horty 2006). Initially moderate (5% of gross wage) and 
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targeted around the minimum wage level, more than eight major re-
forms have reinforced the level of exemptions and broadened its 
scope. In 2016, they concerned more than the bottom half of the la-
bour force of the private sector. The gap of effective contribution rate 
between the minimum wage and 1.6 times the minimum wage is 28 
percent of gross wage. Put differently the State shoulders up to 18% of 
the total labour cost (i.e. €375 per month) at the minimum wage level. 
This policy costs the State yearly more than 22 billion euros, paid by 
transferring the revenue of certain general taxes to the Social security 
fund.  
France is probably the paradigmatic example of this use of fiscal wel-
fare to reform the labour market within a Bismarckian context, but the 
use of reduction in employers’ social security contributions to foster 
job creation is found in other Bismarckian countries, especially in 
those with a relatively high legal minimum wage. For instance, the 
Belgian “reduction structurelle” is a very similar instrument. 
Since 2014, a new piece of tax expenditure, Le Crédit d’Impôt Com-
pétitivité Emploi (CICE) has been implemented to fuel employment: a 
corporate tax credit proportional to the wage of workers below 2.1 
times the mimum wage and degressive until 2.5 times the minimum 
wage. It completely adopts the same design as employer contribution 
reductions8, except than it is a credit on corporate taxation (discussions 
have started so that both schemes could be reshaped in the future into 
one single scheme). This program will cost in 2016 around 18bn eu-
ros. 
                                                 
8 The reason why this time the government did not choose social contribution reduction was twofold : 
first it could benefit firms a year earlier, second more general discussions on the funding system of Social 
security had started with unions, preventing the government from modifying immediately the contribution 
system.  
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Altogether these two programs designed to reduce labour costs 
amount yearly to 2 points of GDP in the form of tax expenditure, in 
order to reduce unemployment9.  
IV.2  In work tax credit: life and death of the Prime Pour 
l’Emploi 
In other types of welfare states, we observe either cuts in payroll taxes 
to fuel labour demand or in-work tax credits to support income and 
develop labour supply: this is the logic behind instruments such as the 
Working Tax Credit in the UK, or Earned Income Tax Credit in the 
US.  But, interestingly, the Prime Pour l’Emploi, which is the French 
equivalent of these measures, was also partly conceived, beyond a 
“make work pay” incentive to work, as an alternative way to boost 
workers’ revenue without raising the statutory minimum wage.  
The PPE was a tax credit introduced in 2001 and suppressed in 201610. 
It was targeted at low-wage workers (income thresholds for eligibility 
applied, which were re-evaluated in the budget law each year). The 
tax credit was individualized - although an income ceiling for the en-
tire tax unit applied. It was calculated annually by the tax administra-
tion, and it either offset tax liability, or was paid out to beneficiaries. 
In 2008, a childless single worker in a full time job paid at the mini-
mum wage would get €980 (the equivalent of a month of net salary 
paid at the minimum wage of 2008). A couple of full-time workers 
both paid at the minimum wage and filing jointly would get €2040 
(calculated from Bonnefoy et al, 2009:89).  
When introduced in 2001, the policy was estimated to cost a little un-
der €2.5 billion (benefitting 8.7 million tax units). Expenditure 
reached a peak at €4.5 billion in 2007 (benefitting 9 million tax units). 
This development was mainly due to discretionary re-evaluations of 
                                                 
9 Evaluations of this policy conclude that it has positive employment effect, but that the windfall effect is 
considerable. Moreover the marginal efficiency of this policy is decreasing (each new billion euro spent 
creates fewer jobs than the previous one) (Carbonnier et al., 2016). 
10 Revenues affected to the PPE were merged with those affected to the RSA activité to create the Prime 
d’activité, a social security benefit for low paid workers. 
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thresholds and increases in generosity, voted yearly in Parliament. 
Interestingly this discretionary development is not correlated with a 
particular party being in government: the PPE was implemented by 
the Jospin socialist government, but the main increases were voted 
under the majoritarian leadership of two conservative governments: 
the Raffarin government in 2003 and the Villepin government in 
2006. Yet, in 2009, the Fillon government (also conservative) decided 
not to re-evaluate the thresholds for the calculation of the tax credit, 
leading to its erosion. It also introduced a new direct benefit, called 
RSA activité, which amount was deducted from beneficiaries’ entitle-
ment to the PPE. The PPE was finally taken down by another socialist 
government, under the Hollande presidency.  
Although in 2001 and 2006 the PPE was boasted as an exemplary 
“make work pay” policy, the scheme has arguably much more to do 
with a distributive measure than an employment policy (Touzet, 
2016). The target of the PPE was very wide: almost 45% of people in 
the 3rd decile of income, and 25% of people in the 7th decile received 
the PPE in 2002 (Bonnefoy et al, 2009:94); between 2001 and 2008, 
the yearly pool of beneficiaries represented around 35% of the em-
ployed population11. It was introduced in 2001, and massively enlarged 
in 2006, each time before presidential elections. It is thus plausible 
that the measure was originally conceived as a distributional scheme 
with a large target; while raising the minimum wage would only bene-
fit minimum wage earners (around 2.5 million workers), the tax credit 
reached 9 million workers.  
Both when implemented in 2001 and expanded in 2006, the PPE was 
indeed in part defended as a means of “sharing the benefits of growth” 
(Migaud, 2001); yet in France, this objective was traditionally pursued 
through increases in the minimum wage. The fact that governments 
                                                 
11 Calculated from data on beneficiaries in France from Cour des Comptes (2005) for years 2001-2004, 
Bonnefoy et al (2009) for years 2005 to 2008, Projets annuels de performance, mission “Remboursement 
et Dégrèvements” for years 2009-2013, data on employed population from INSEE online database.  
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chose not to do so in 2001 and 2006, and instead opted for income 
top-up in the form of an in-work tax credit, signals both an attempt at 
a moderate path-breaking (moderate because the minimum wage was 
not suppressed or reduced), as well as the fact that the high statutory 
minimum wage was increasingly perceived as an institutional con-
straint, to be circumvented. This scheme may also be interpreted as a 
way of subsidizing what came to be perceived as the overly high cost 
of labour for employers: lower wages could be offered to employees 
since the latter could benefit instead from the PPE. 
IV.3 Targeted job creation incentives: the case of the household 
services sector 
Tax expenditures and social contribution exemptions have also been 
used to foster the development of specific economic sectors. One such 
example is the state-led development of the household services sector. 
Households can deduct 50% of the cost incurred for the purchase of 
household services from their PIT, and household services providers 
benefit from a reduced VAT rate as well as from employer social con-
tribution exemptions (only on care related services). Altogether, these 
tax expenditures amounted to 6,9 billion euros in 2011. While low-
skilled job creation has been a major rationale behind the development 
of this sector, responding to the growing needs for child- and especial-
ly elderly-care has also been an important objective (cf. Morel, 2015; 
Carbonnier and Morel, 2015). Here, the use of tax expenditures in this 
sector can be read both as a response to the issue of high labour costs 
and high minimum wage, which were understood as constraining de-
mand for low-skilled jobs in the private service sector, but it also fits 
with the traditional pattern of subsidiarity and free choice typical of 
the French welfare state in the field of family policy. Indeed, the first 
measures in this field were first introduced in 1948, in the form of 
social contribution exemptions for elderly people purchasing care ser-
vices, supplemented by a tax break in the 1960s, and expanded in 
1986 to families with young children purchasing private, home-based 
childcare services (Guiraudon and Ledoux, 2015). The tax breaks 
were further expanded in 1991, when they became available to all 
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households, independently of care needs, for a large range of house-
hold services. These tax expenditures thus respond to both employ-
ment and social policy aims. 
V. Siphoning off earmarked social security revenue to fuel net 
earnings and private insurance: a very quiet layering strategy 
The previous section shows that STEs can be used to circumvent ex-
isting institutions of the labour market. STEs have also been a conven-
ient tool to foster the development of private health and retirement 
insurance markets, in a typical strategy of institutional “layering”.  
Indeed, existing institutional settings like earmarked resources as well 
as the high level of political support for public social insurances 
across the political spectrum meant that upfront attempts to reduce or 
privatize those schemes were both difficult and politically very risky. 
While the use of STEs to stimulate the demand and supply of private 
contracts is widespread across countries, we argue that this stimulation 
takes a specific form in Bismarckian contexts, characterized by two 
distinct effects: i) the targeted siphoning off of public social security 
funds (instead of general government revenue), and ii) the develop-
ment of a neo-Bismarckian private component of social insurance, in 
the form of collective corporatist plans, based on industry or firm-
level solidarity and regulated by the State).  
In a country with a high level of social expenditures such as France in 
the 1990s, the demand for private services and insurance contract is 
crowded out in two ways: first, since most social risks are addressed 
with a high quality standard by public benefits, the spontaneous de-
mand for private provision of services is almost inexistent (this was 
the case of pensions), or smaller than in other countries (as was the 
case of health insurance).  Second, since these schemes are largely 
paid for by social security contributions levied on wages, net income 
from labour was relatively lower than in other countries, which re-
duced individuals’ ability to purchase private services. Additionally, 
this funding mechanism ensures a growth of resources comparable to 
the growth of wages (and of the economy), and it is difficult for the 
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State either to reduce this growth, or to divert these fiscal resources 
towards a different purpose.  
However, in the 1990s, in the face of growing social needs and of 
growing costs (linked to various factors such as population ageing, 
increased female labour participation, or the increased cost of 
healthcare), a consensus emerged among policymakers according to 
which social expenditures should be frozen and private alternatives 
developed (through third pillar pensions, private health insurance, 
personal services, etc. (see Naczyk (2016) for an analysis of how this 
new paradigm developed.)  
Accordingly, a specific type of STE was developed, in order to foster 
the development of private markets through discretely diverting re-
sources away from the officially sheltered social security funds, and 
into private funds. These STEs consist of exclusions of some forms of 
employee compensation from the tax basis of social security contribu-
tions; namely, compensations taking the form of different occupation-
al benefits (collective private health insurance, private pension plans, 
fringe benefits, collective shareholder plans…) are excluded from that 
tax basis.  
These schemes are conceived both as “incentives” for employers to 
purchase such occupational benefits for their employees, as a com-
plementary form of compensation, but they also tend to replace pay 
rises as a bargaining chip during wage negotiations. In effect, they 
allow subsidizing private occupational social services, while diminish-
ing social security contributions funding public insurances (which 
partly results in the reduction of entitlements to public benefits for the 
concerned workers). The cost of a collective private insurance contract 
gets subsidized between 17,5% and 25% of its value by these exemp-
tions of social security contributions (and up to 28% in the case of 
some health insurance contracts for “prévoyance” (see below). This 
arrangement was intentionally designed to encourage the development 
of private markets, which did not happen spontaneously (see Naczyk 
2016 on pensions). 
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This mechanism also allowed the government to organize these 
emerging private markets, by setting the criteria for eligibility to this 
subsidy (since this creates huge competition distortions penalizing 
substitutable services that are not eligible to the exemption). This has 
been the case for different types of private pension plans (Naczyk 
2016) as well as collective health insurance contracts, under certain 
conditions of quality and solidarity among the members (at the ex-
pense of the development of individual voluntary contracts) (Kerleau 
2009, Turquet 2006). The case of the “responsible” complementary 
healthcare contracts (see below) is one example of this.   
Altogether, more than 9% of the gross wage of employees of the pri-
vate sector is now excluded from the basis of social security contribu-
tions, diminishing the resources of social security funds by about 23.6 
billion in 201412 (1point of GDP).  Of that amount, 33% is dedicated to 
collective private health insurance plans and 5.5% to private pension 
plans.  
V.1.  Tax subsidies for complementary health insurance 
The total cost of STEs in the field of health policy in revenue foregone 
is € 16.5 bn. This amount is concentrated on two specific policies 
which cost is superior to € 1bn13: among these, the largest is indeed 
aimed at favouring the development of complementary health insur-
ance, and incentivizes the private purchase of collective complemen-
tary health insurance (type 3 of our classification). It is particularly 
costly: in 2014, it led to a foregone revenue of €7.8 bn (0.4% of GDP) 
(figure 4). This revenue foregone for public social insurance funds is 
not compensated by the state.  
 
                                                 
12 Estimation from Houssoy and Zemmour (2016), based on public reports and our own calculation. The 
French government systematically underestimates the revenue forgone by taking into account one single 
Social security fund instead of all the public mandatory funds (Zemmour 2016).  
13 The second measure is a reduced VAT rate on drugs that are eligible for reimbursement by the public 
healthcare system; in 2014 it amounted to €2.1 billion of revenue foregone.  
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Figure 4 – Tax expenditures for health care: breakdown by type and estimation 
of cost (in million euros, in 2014) 
 
This measure particularly targets the development of collective and 
compulsory private occupational insurance against accidents and long 
term health issues (“prévoyance”). Employers’ participation to the 
purchase of private insurance contracts on behalf of their employees is 
excluded from the tax base on which are calculated employers’ and 
employees’ social security contributions (including those supposed to 
accrue to the unemployment and retirement funds). This exclusion 
only applies to collective and compulsory contracts. Employers of 
more than 10 employees still pay a reduced flat rate tax of 8% on their 
contributions to private insurance funds, called “forfait social”; ceil-
ings also apply to the exemption.  
The first exemption of the sort dates back to 1979, and was capped in 
1985. The measure was restricted to compulsory and collective con-
tracts in 2003 (although the conditionality only took effect in 2009). In 
2004, another criterion was added, that of the “responsibility” of the 
contract: “responsible” contracts are those which uphold the incen-
tives set in the public healthcare system in order to contain the cost of 
healthcare. Ceilings applied to the exemption were also individualized 
and became dependent on individual income. According to the High 
Council on the future of public health insurance (HCAAM, 2013), an 
average subsidy of €230 per contract (which, on average, costs €800) 
is awarded through that STE.  
2017/03 
24 
Since 2016 these contracts that top up social security health insurance 
have become mandatory for firms of the private sectors. This evolu-
tion makes the “incentive” effect useless (since firms’ behavior is now 
constrained by the law) and the “exemption” scheme becomes a pure 
instrument of public subsidization of private contracts. 
V.2. Tax subsidies for occupational private pension plans 
In the field of retirement, STEs amount to a total of €6.9 billion; €4.4 
billion correspond to various reductions of taxation for the elderly, 
while more than €2.5 billion are spent in incentives for pensions and 
asset formation. Of the latter category, €1.2 billion favour the devel-
opment of individual pension plans, while 1.3 billion are incentives 
for collective occupational plans (figure 5). 
Figure 5– Tax expenditures for pensioners (in million euros, in 2014) 
 
Two schemes in particular aim at developing private collective occu-
pational alternatives to the institution of public retirement: the “re-
traite supplémentaire” (€1.1 billion in 2014) and the “plan d’épargne 
pour la retraite collectif “ (PERCO, €184 million in 2014).  
The main difference between the two schemes is that the first one only 
applies to collective and compulsory occupational plans, while em-
ployees can opt out of a PERCO. PERCO plans are employees’ sav-
ings which they access upon retirement, and which are funded by con-
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tributions from both employees and employers; they can be imple-
mented either at the firm level or at the industry level.  
Employers’ contributions to supplementary (collective and mandato-
ry) and PERCO (collective and optional) retirement plans are exclud-
ed from the tax basis of social security contributions14 (up to a ceiling). 
Since 2010, employees can also decide to affect the amounts corre-
sponding to days off which they have not taken to their PERCO. 
These amounts are also excluded from the basis of employers’ social 
security contributions. Foregone revenue for public funds is not com-
pensated by the general government budget. 
The historical development of these schemes is a good illustration of 
the siphoning off logic described above. Naczyk (2016) documents the 
strategy implemented by third party insurance providers and financial 
industry actors, starting in the 1970s, to push for the development of 
supplementary private pensions, on top of the public and occupational 
ones, in a typical institutional “layering” (Streeck and Thelen, 2005) 
fashion. Despite initial political opposition from left-wing actors and 
trade unions, which saw this development as a threat to the pay-as-
you-go system, over time these actors managed to build a political 
consensus strong enough that they were able not only to favour those 
plans, but also to quietly de-fund public pension funds by the same 
token.  
Thus patience, but also diversion, made for a successful layering strat-
egy: the argument put forward originally (starting in the 1970s, 1980s) 
had as much, if not more, to do with favoring household savings and 
supplying financial markets as with reforming pension systems; the 
first plans of this type were created in 1987, not as part of a pension 
reform, but as part of a “law on savings (Loi du 17 juin 1987 sur 
l’épargne)” which aimed at boosting household savings level 
(Naczyk, 2016:11). The argument then evolved into a critique of pay-
                                                 
14 This includes contributions to public healthcare and retirement funds, but also unemployment funds, 
and complementary mandatory occupational pensions funds managed by the social partners.  
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as-you-go pensions as unsustainable, especially with rising life expec-
tancy and unemployment.  
Although the precise point of whether employers’ contributions 
should be excluded from the tax basis of social security contributions 
was particularly contested by trade unions and left-wing parties (in 
particular, unions wanted employers’ contributions to be subjected to 
contributions to public and complementary occupational retirement 
funds), a compromise was finally found, with the exclusion main-
tained and an additional special (reduced) level on employers’ contri-
bution established. Still, this special contribution does not compensate 
the revenue foregone for public and occupational pension funds (first 
and second pillars); in that way, a direct revenue diversion is estab-
lished between those funds and the third pillar’s supplementary pen-
sions, through the use of STEs.  
Conclusion  
Fiscal welfare is present in all developed welfare states with a variable 
intensity. Based on the present in-depth study of the French case, it is 
possible to argue that in those welfare states that appear to be charac-
terized by an intermediate level of “tax breaks for social purposes” in 
the OECD comparative data (Adema et al, 2014), the actual size of 
fiscal welfare might be seriously underestimated.  
Some traits of fiscal welfare appear to be shared across contexts, from 
political motivations to effects. However, the present article demon-
strates the relevance of developing a situated analysis of the specific 
uses of fiscal welfare instruments across institutional contexts.  
One of the major results of scholars studying fiscal welfare in the US 
has been to demonstrate that ignoring it led to a misunderstanding of 
both the actual scope of the US welfare state, and of its patterns of 
institutional change. We argue that a similar analysis should be ap-
plied in different contexts, to shed light on the functioning and evolu-
tion of welfare institutions that are intrinsic to those contexts. In addi-
LIEPP Working Paper n° 65 
27 
tion to taxation and to cash and in-kind benefits, social tax expendi-
tures are used to fulfill situated social policy goals: sometimes, they 
allow complementing other policy tools (as is the case of family poli-
cy in France); sometimes they are a means of discrete institutional 
reform (the layering of the French social insurances is a case in point); 
sometimes, they are used to gain some level of freedom in a con-
strained policy environment (this is the case of employment policy in 
France). Although those patterns of use might be similar across cases, 
the particular goals and policy fields affected are likely to be strongly 
context-dependent. 
In many cases, the particular overall structure of fiscal welfare (in the 
French case, it is characterized by the dominance of employment-
related STEs), the political motivations behind the use of STEs, or the 
social and economic functions performed by STEs can only be 
grasped by integrating them into the larger understanding of welfare 
regime specificities. Thus, half of the French STEs concern in particu-
lar social security contributions; we have shown in this article that this 
particularity was explained by the specificities of the French welfare 
state, namely the combination of a high minimum wage and the strong 
political legitimacy of the financing of social protection  through so-
cial security contributions. These institutional specificities lead to a 
circumventing strategy in the field of employment policy, and a strat-
egy of layering in the field of healthcare and retirement, allowing to 
discretely use resources from social security funds to subsidize the 
expansion of a private insurance pillar. Although this aspect of fiscal 
welfare might characterize other corporatist conservative countries, it 
is unlikely to be characteristic of liberal countries, or in places where 
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